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THE LEGAL ADVOCATE AND THE
QUESTIONABLY COMPETENT
CLIENT IN THE CONTEXT OF A

POVERTY LAW CLINIC©
By

DIANA

A. ROMANO*

Advocates representing the poor must, above all, take
into account the extreme vulnerability of their clients.
This challenge is heightened where one suspects that a
client may lack the capacity to provide appropriate
instructions. This article considers the issue of how
competency should be defined and the options
available where incompetency is determined.
Ultimately, advocacy must include personal
empowerment as well as legal representation.

Les personnes qui repr6sentent des gens pauvres
doivent avant tout tenir compte de la vulnrabilit6
extr6me de leurs clients. Ce d6fi s'intensifie lorsque
l'on entretient des doutes au sujet de la capacit6 d'un
client Adonner des directives appropri6es. Le pr6sent
article examine ]a question de la d6finition de la
capacit6 et discute des choix possibles une fois
l'incapacit6 6tablie. En d6finitive, les interventions
doivent a la fois viser l'habilitation du client et la
repr6sentation juridique.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A tiny woman with a greyish complexion and frail appearance
comes into the clinic. "Jane" has been eligible for social assistance
benefits as a permanently unemployable person as the result of a thyroid
condition for the past five years but suddenly has been deemed to be
ineligible. She asks for assistance appealing the director's decision. We
agree to represent her. Eventually, she reveals that the real reason she
cannot work is because she has at least two forms of cancer but her
family doctor and specialists refuse to admit it. She is convinced that the
doctors are conspiring against her. She suddenly begins talking about
suing the doctors and alerting, the media. Although her doctors have
previously diagnosed her with depression, paranoia, and hypochondria,
she adamantly refuses to see a psychiatrist.
"Alice," who is in her late thirties, has not worked since 1989
when she was in her first motor vehicle accident. Before she could
completely recover, she was involved in a second motor vehicle accident.
Since that time she claims to be in constant pain. Currently on welfare,
she wants us to appeal a decision that she is ineligible for family benefits
as a permanently unemployable person (PuE). We agree to represent
her. Her family doctor lists her primary condition as "chronic pain
syndrome." The Medical Advisory Board (MAB), which makes
recommendations to the Director of Income Maintenance, notes in its
assessment that chronic pain syndrome does not appear in Dorland's
Illustrated Medical Dictionaryl and "is generally not clinically
recognized." Alice has seen several specialists. As we begin to gather
medical evidence on her behalf, medical reports consistently state that
there is no physical explanation for her pain. Several doctors gently
suggest that she is suffering from depression and, rather than
physiotherapy, she is in need of psychotherapy. Ignoring her doctor's
advice, she continues to visit her physiotherapist three times a week with
very limited success. She cannot be persuaded to see a psychiatrist.
What is the role of the legal advocate in a poverty law clinic

1 (Philadelphia: Saunders, 1994).
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when one suspects that a client may be unable to provide appropriate
instructions? Advocates representing the poor must, above all, take into
account the extreme vulnerability of their clients. The majority of legal
aid clients possess few resources, but face many constrictions. Most of
those who will approach a poverty law clinic for assistance represent the
socially isolated: they are the aged; the lonely; the uneducated; the
unskilled. Clients may not have any relatives or friends in their
communities on whom they can rely for emotional or financial support.
Illiteracy is common and the client's education often consists primarily
of what he or she has learned in the struggle to survive. Many clients
recognize that they are being targeted by the current provincial
government and that the social "safety net" is deteriorating rapidly.
They come to the clinic frustrated, angry, afraid, and, above all, confused
as to why they must continuously fight for what little they have.
The legal advocate in a legal aid clinic must listen to the client's
concerns. Where the legal advocate fears that the client's requests might
place the client in an even greater position of vulnerability, the advocate
may be reluctant to take the client's instructions. The first step must be
to determine whether the client is, in fact, capable of giving directions.
Where the client appears to be incapacitated, the advocate must then
decide if a guardian is required, what type of guidance the advocate
should provide, and how the client's best interests should be ascertained.
Unfortunately, the advocate must undertake the major responsibility of
providing competent service for an incompetent client without adequate
guidance from the Rules of ProfessionalConduct established by the Law
Society of Upper Canada.2 Unlike the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct instituted by the American Bar Association,3 the Law Society of
Upper Canada rules do not directly address the issue of the client who is
unable to advise his or her representative according to the principles of
informed consent.
Much of the literature available on the relationship between a
lawyer and a mentally ill client occurs in the context of criminal law
where the dilemma revolves around whether or not to raise the defence
of insanity. The defence of insanity has important consequences for the
client because it may mean the difference between being detained in a
prison or detained in a medical facility. The liberty of the client is what
is ultimately at stake. The strategies available to the legal advocate in
2 Law Society of Upper Canada, ProfessionalConduct Handbook (Toronto: L.S.U.C., 1997)

[hereinafter Rules].
3 American Bar Association, House of Delegates, Model Rules of Professional Conduct

(Chicago: A.B.A., 1995) [hereinafter Model Rules].
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the context of social assistance law may also impact upon the client's
quality of life. One's standard of living is dramatically affected if his or
her family benefits, which are available to persons without dependents
but who meet the criterion of being "permanently unemployable," are
arbitrarily cut off. The difference between being on welfare and being
on family benefits as a PUE person is that on welfare one is forced to
perform job searches, and on family benefits one need not fear being cut
off for failing to perform these searches to the satisfaction of welfare
workers. Also, in Ontario, a person on general welfare receives roughly
$520 per month including a shelter allowance of $325, while a family
benefits recipient receives approximately $900 per month including
shelter, and is entitled to other benefits including being allowed to
attend school.
Another important issue, in which a client may be in need of
psychiatric care or counselling, is the dignity and autonomy of the client.
To be reliant on a social assistance allowance means to be accountable
to others for many things. An allowance cheque is certainly not without
cost to the recipient; the price is often dignity and the right to privacy.
Recipients must produce their bankbooks, passports, and leases at the
caseworker's request. They must notify their worker when they want to
leave the province and obtain their worker's permission to buy a car.
Recipients can have their cheques suspended until they move into a less
expensive apartment or until the landlord confirms that rent is being
paid. Their cheques may be reduced solely on the basis that they are
living with another person of the opposite sex. Many clients, especially
those with a history of being undermined and misunderstood by their
welfare or family benefits worker, will be likely to resist or resent any
proposal from their legal advocate that a mental disorder may exist. To
suggest, therefore, that there is really no doctor conspiracy or no pain,
for example, may further alienate the client from needed assistance.
Instead of being recognized as a source of help, the advocate may appear
to be part of the very institution which the client perceives to have
neglected or abused them. The alternative, however, may be to offer
largely ineffective representation in which the client has virtually no
hope of being found eligible for benefits. The representative in a
poverty law clinic must define the duties of advocacy, as well as take into
account the clinic's ultimate goal of empowerment.

The Questionably Competent Client
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II. DEFINITION OF ADVOCACY
Black's Law Dictionary4 vaguely defines an advocate as:
one who assists, defends, orpleads for another. One who renders legal advice and aid

and pleads the cause of another before a court or a tribunal, a counsellor. A person
learned in the law, and duly admitted to practice, who assists his client with advice, and

pleads for him in open court. An assistant; adviser, a pleader of causes. 5

If to be an advocate generally means to speak out on behalf of another,
what voice is the advocate to use?
Although the lawyer has the exclusive privilege of presenting the
arguments and only the client can provide evidence, the most powerful
role in the client-attorney dynamic is inevitably that of decisionmaker.
Traditionally, the approach to decisionmaking was such that the client
decided the goals of the lawsuit while the attorney controlled the means
to achieve those results: "the client determines such 'ends' as whether to
settle a civil suit or to plead guilty in a criminal case, and the attorney
decides, even contrary to the client's express wishes, what legal and
constitutional arguments or defences to raise."6 Marcy Strauss notes the
irony that although attorneys were instrumental in securing a patient's
right to information regarding their medical condition and treatment
during the 1950s, only in recent years have attorneys adopted this model
of ensuring that their clients are informed for themselves. 7 Currently,
the concept of basing one's strategies on the client's instructions is being
advanced as the ideal model for the advocate-client relationship: "The
supposition that lawyers know what is best for their clients is no longer
as accepted as it may have been in the past; instead, the profession has
grown in the realization that the most effective lawyering decisions are
made by clients themselves." 8
This concept of the lawyer taking instructions from a client is
referred to as the doctrine of "informed consent," and possesses four
essential elements: disclosure of information; comprehension of

4 J.R. Nolan et aL, eds., 6th ed. (St. Paul: West Co., 1990).

5 lbid. at 55.
6 M. Strauss, "Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for
Autonomy" (1987) 65 N.C. L Rev. 315 at 318.
71bid.
8 P. Tremblay, "On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the
Questionably Competent Client" [1987] Utah L Rev. 515 at 515-16.
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information; voluntary consent; and competence to consent. 9 In the
context of medical care, "the requirement for informed consent is met
when competent patients have received and understood information
relevant to their condition and proposed procedures and have freely
authorized the implementation of those procedures."o The doctrine of
informed consent has been consistently and appropriately praised for the
way it promotes the autonomy of the individual, the protection of a
person's rights, and self-scrutiny by professionals.1 1 The doctrine is
particularly germane in the context of a poverty law clinic which is
strongly committed to empowering clients. Clients are empowered not
only by an increased allowance cheque but also by the advocate's
recognition of the validity of their requests, concerns, and reactions.
The legal advocate must recognize that "the foundation of the principle
of autonomy is respect for the individual; if the individual is competent
to make the decision in question, and is given sufficient information to
make the decision, her decision-no matter how wrong it may seem to
others-must be respected."1 2
III. DEFINITION OF INCOMPETENCY
Unfortunately, the doctrine of informed consent is unhelpful
when the client is incompetent. Legislation has recognized, generally in
the context of management of property, that individuals are not always
capable of making decisions for themselves. As the doctrine of
"informed consent" requires that the client be competent, it is necessary
that the legal advocate be permitted to make an assessment about his or
her client's ability to offer instructions.
The Ontario Mental Health Act 13 defines a mentally competent
person as a person who has the "ability to understand the subject-matter
in respect of which consent is requested and is able to appreciate the
consequences of giving or withholding consent."1 4 Similarly, the Health

9 D.D. Welch, "Walking in Their Shoes: Paying Respect to Incompetent Patients" (1989) 42
Vanderbilt L Rev. 1617 at 1620.
10
Ibi&
11 IbiL at 1621.
12 M. Martin, "Defending the Mentally IIl Client in Criminal Matters: Ethics, Advocacy, and
Responsibility" (1993) 52 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 73 at 85.
13 R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7.
14

Ibid.s. 1.
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Care Consent Act, 199615 defines "mentally capable" in section 4 as
possessing the means "to understand the information that is relevant to
making a decision...and [being] able to appreciate the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision." D. Don
Welch provides an interesting definition of competency. He suggests:
Competency is the measure of whether persons possess the capability for autonomous
action. Incompetence means that persons are not able to exercise self-determination in a
meaningful way. When persons are not able to understand their own situations, when

they are unable to comprehend the likely results of alternative procedures, then those
persons are not autonomous in the context of the particular purpose and setting at
16
hand.

These definitions, which focus on the client's ability to act in his
or her own best interest in a given situation, present an interesting
challenge for the legal advocate. What situations must the client
understand? For the purposes of the legal advocate, should an
incompetent client only be one who is unable to fully grasp the nature or
potential outcome of his or her legal situation? Marc Schiffer concludes,
legitimately, that the level of comprehension required to stand trial as
the accused is minimal. 17 Under section 672.22 of the CriminalCode,18
there is a presumption of fitness to stand trial unless the court is satisfied
on the balance of probabilities that the accused is unfit to stand trial.
Under section 2 of the Criminal Code the state of being "unfit to stand
trial" is defined as an inability to understand the nature, object, and
possible consequences of the proceedings or communicate with counsel.
The client should know what he or she is charged with, the consequences
of a conviction, what an oath is, the penalty for lying, the purpose of a
trial, and the people in a courtroom, and what pleas are possible.19
Interestingly, Schiffer notes that although the general consensus among
the profession is that the client should be able to instruct counsel, the
term "instruct counsel" is a misnomer as "in reality it has been said a
defendant only supplies counsel with whatever information he may have
concerning the case to enable counsel to in turn advise him and handle

15 Being Schedule A to the Advocacy, Consent and Substitute Decisions Statute Law
AmendmentAct, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2.
16 Welch, supra note 9 at 1625.
17

M.E. Schiffer, Mental Disorderand the Criminal Trial Process: The Pre-Trialand Post-Trial

Stages (LL.M. Thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 1976).
18 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
19 Schiffer, supranote 17 at 100-06.
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his defence." 20 Finally, the client's ability to concentrate and participate
should also be assessed.21 This minimal requirement of fitness is based
on principles articulated in R. v. Swain,22 which is considered to be a
leading case governing fitness. Chief Justice Lamer noted:
Given that the principles of fundamental justice contemplate an accusatorial and
adversarial system of criminal justice which is founded on respect for the autonomy and
dignity of human beings, it seems clear to me that the principles of fundamental justice
must also require that an accused person have the right to control his or her own
defence...Thus, an accused who has not been found unfit to stand trial must be
considered capable of conducting his or her own defence. 23

Both Jane and Alice were cognizant that they needed legal
representation to appeal the decisions which had rendered them
ineligible for social assistance. They walked into the clinic of their own
volition. Both women came to understand that they would need to
prove the reasons why they could not work as of the date they applied
and that they must be unable to work for a prolonged period of time.
Both women understood the consequences of not persuading the Board
as to the correctness of their appeal. In essence, both clients understood
the nature of their legal situation. What they seemed to have difficulty
comprehending, however, was the nature of their medical situation. For
the purposes of the legal advocate, does a difficulty understanding a
non-legal element which strongly impacts on their legal situation
p6tentially render a person incompetent?
A. DeterminingIncompetency
According to Dr. Stephen A. Kline, "[tihe issue of determining
competency is one of the most demanding and vexatious [issues] facing
psychiatrists in day-to-day clinical practice." 24 Dr. Angus McDonald
suggests that an assessment of competency should extend beyond a
simple test:
It is the focus on the relatively easy issues-such as, does the accused realize what he or
she has been charged with-rather than on the more difficult issue of his or her ability to

20

ibid. at 102.

21 R. v. Taylor (1992), 11 O.R. (3d) 323 at 336-39 (C.A.).
22 [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933.
23

Ibid. at 972.

24 S.A. Kline, "The Clinical Issues of Determining Competency" (1987) 8(1) Health L. Can. 4
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instruct and/or participate in the court proceedings, that leads many lawyers to see fitness
when many psychiatrists are much more doubtful. 25

Dr. McDonald notes that many individuals who are mentally ill can
understand the basic principles of a trial but may have severe
concentration defects or suffer hallucinations "to an extent that the
proceedings in court cannot be attended to in a meaningful way." 26 An
assessment of competency may be further complicated by varying
degrees of confusion:
Competence is often not a steady state phenomenon. It may fluctuate markedly. The
quality and quantity of the information presented, the effect of the setting, and the
relationship with the examining clinician all have profound effects on any assessment.
visits are necessary to obtain the essential
Considerable expertise and often numerous
27
information in this dynamic environment.

Obviously, the average legal advocate lacks the training to
perform psychological tests to measure a client's level of competency.
What other avenues are available? Dr. Bruce Quarrington suggests that:
The first, and most acceptable sort of information to be used when assessing competence
is that provided by a familiar of the person, spontaneously engaging in activities of
everyday life in which incompetence is alleged or suspected. If this familiar is governed
by what is in the best interests of the person, and if the observations are recent and
reasonably extensive, we accept his/her judgement of competency since they have an
obvious validity. No additional information is needed 28

Clearly, the average legal advocate will not possess first hand knowledge
of the client's daily activities. Realistically, throughout the time the file
remains open, the legal advocate may have, in fact, very limited contact
with the client. The interactions that do take place are likely to occur in
the context of the legal clinic itself or over the telephone. The initial
intake interview lasts an average of only twenty minutes and should not
be the basis for any quick conclusions as to competency as many clients
are legitimately agitated by their legal predicament and may have initial
difficulty grasping their options. Many revelations which have not made
sense initially, have later been clarified as the result of phone calls.
Determining a client's competency on the basis of the initial interview
does the client an enormous disservice and is contrary to the clinic's
25 A. McDonald, "Fitness to Stand Trial: A Legal and Ethical Dilemma" (1988) 8(3) Health
L. Can. 71 at 72.
26
'bid.
27

Kline, supra note 24 at 6.

28 B. Quarrington, "Approaches to the Assessment of Mental Competency" (1994) 15 Health
L. Can. 35 at 35.
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commitment to empowering clients. The advocate must be conscious of
his or her own biases and allow room for the clarification of issues of
confusion.
Clearly, the legal advocate is not in a position to determine
competency through assessing the client's activities as he or she does not
fit into the category of "familiars." 29 Should the advocate be encouraged
to discuss the client's mental capacity with those who interact with the
client in everyday situations? Rule 4 of the LSUC Rules stresses the
importance of confidentiality: "The lawyer has a duty to hold in strict
confidence all information concerning the business and affairs of the
client acquired in the course of the professional relationship, and should
not divulge any such information unless expressly or impliedly
authorized by the client or required by law to do so."30 Commentary 3
instructs the lawyer to refrain from even disclosing that one has been
retained by the client. 31 Therefore, the only way the legal advocate will
be able to discuss the client's state of mind with a friend or family
member is with the permission of the client. Alice's family members
were reluctant to participate in the hearing even to the extent that they
would not be available to confirm in front of the Review Board that pain
has affected Alice's life. In Jane's case, however, we worked with a
representative from a community group who was given permission to
contact us by the client, who signed a consent to release information
form. Jane's situation, unfortunately, demonstrated that the existence of
a person who is able to clarify the client's mental competence, is not
always beneficial to the legal advocate or the client. In the end, Jane was
extremely unhappy and felt patronized by her mental health advocate, 32
who became a significant source of stress to the client. Eventually, we
were asked by the client to cease communicating with the mental health
advocate. 33 Even if the legal advocate has the client's permission to
discuss the case with another person, the advocate must be reasonably
29

30

bid

Rules, supra note 2 at 11.

311Jbid

32 Jane was unaware that her mental health advocate believed Jane had a mental disorder and
was committed to protecting her from being hurt by this process. Jane merely perceived the woman
as an advocate from her community centre for the socially isolated.
33 Jane called us in considerable distress a few days after the hearing. She had initially
allowed her mental health advocate to make a photocopy of the submissions we prepared for her
case. When she asked for the copy to be given to her, the centre refused. Because Jane was
extremely upset that they had a copy of her medical reports, the centre agreed to return the copy to
us and we promised it would be destroyed.
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sure that the confidante has the client's best interests in mind and will
continue to respect the client's rights and decisions before he or she acts
on that person's recommendations.
B. Testfor Incompetency
Given the role, responsibilities, and limitations of the legal
advocate, the test for impairment should be based solely upon the
client's ability to relate to his or her advocate. Although there is no
Canadian equivalent, Rule 1.14 of the American Bar Association's
Model Rules bases the test of incompetency on the client's "ability to
make adequately considered decisions in connection with the
representation." 34 The legal advocate should, therefore, focus on how
these decisions are reached, rather than on the perceived quality of the
decisions:
The most important task for the legal standard of competency is to distinguish effectively
between foolish, socially deviant, risky, or simply "crazy" choices made competently, and
comparable choices made incompetently. Although incompetent behaviour may be
restrained, identical competent behaviour may not. This distinction fosters and protects
autonomy, dignity, and responsibility. A person may have a right to choose to harm
himself or to forego benefits, but a person who harnis himself, not by choice but because
of illness, should be restrained. To make this distinction, competence has been defined in

terms of process and not in terms of result.35

If the client is able to relay that his or her thought process is based on a
correct understanding of his or her legal situation, then the client's
instructions must be respected, even to the client's detriment.
C. OptionsAvailable for Advocates of Incompetent Clients
Once the lawyer is convinced that his or her client's decision
making ability is impaired what options are available? Paul Tremblay
outlines the range of choices available to the lawyer whose client's
judgement is impaired. The legal advocate might (1) follow the client's
wishes as if he or she were any other competent client; (2) seek a
guardian for the client, either by serving as petitioner or by recruiting a
third party to accomplish this task; (3) seek unofficial consent from a
family member or close friend; (4) seek to persuade the client to make
34

Supra note 3 at 45.

35

Tremblay, supra note 8 at 537-38.
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different and "better choices" (an approach that arguably is
inappropriate with unimpaired clients); (5) proceed as a de facto
guardian, simply making choices for the client without actual consent; or
(6) withdraw.36
The appropriateness of these options for the legal advocate must
be carefully measured against the LSUC Rules. The Rules stress the
importance of confidentiality of information, competence of service, and
ethics in advocacy.
D. Withdrawalof Services
The option of the legal advocate to withdraw his or her services
may be appropriate where one feels that he or she is unable to provide
effective representation. Commentary 3 of suc Rule 2 concludes, "[i]t
follows that the lawyer should not undertake a matter without honestly
feeling competent to handle it, or able to become competent without
undue delay, risk or expense to the client." 37 Laura A. Naide in an essay
entitled "Incompetent Clients" notes:
When dealing with an incompetent client, an attorney is required to play many roles.
Although in representing incompetent clients the same issues are often raised in each
case, the attorney's obligation ultimately hinges on the type and degree of disability from
which his client suffers. Because the incompetent client is in a weaker position than
someone who would be considered competent by the courts, the attorney is required to
take on greater responsibility in order to provide full representation to his client.38

Incompetent clients demand that the advocate confront his or her own
personal biases and develop an awareness of the challenges clients with
mental disorders may experience. In her article, "Tips for Lawyers
Representing Psychiatric Survivors," Lilith Finkler explains that
psychiatric survivors may, for example, measure time differently and that
their medication may interfere with their ability to concentrate,
pronounce words, or coordinate movements.39 Stan Delaney also warns
advocates: "Many people with psychiatric problems are under a great
deal of pressure and stress. Every effort should be made not to rush

36

Ibid at 519-20.

37

Rules, supra note 2 at 3.

38

L.A. Naide, "Incompetent Clients" (1991) 5 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 199 at 199.

39 Parkdale Community Legal Services, TrainingMaterials (1995) 135 [unpublished].
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people into making decisions or commitments." 40 The advocate must,
therefore, be committed to demonstrating patience.
While withdrawing permits the advocate to effectively avoid the
situation, this option may leave the client in a state of increased
vulnerability. Clients on or requiring social assistance cannot afford to
hire a lawyer and legal aid certificates are becoming increasingly scarce.
Nevertheless, in the context of appealing decisions made by the
provincial Director of Income Maintenance, legal representation is not
mandatory. A person who has been denied family benefits may
represent himself or herself before the Social Assistance Review Board
(SARB). The applicant would be asked questions by the board and
allowed to state the reasons why he or she should have an allowance.
The applicant, however, would be dependent upon the board asking the
right questions and eliciting the information that the applicant wants to
relay. An advocate, therefore, has an important role in the context of a
SARB hearing. The advocate can prepare written submissions with
exhibits for the board which clearly outline the facts and the argument.
The advocate should stress the importance of the case to the board, cite
appropriate supporting case law, and prepare the client to answer
questions. Many clients may be reluctant or unprepared to discuss the
impact of their medical condition on their daily lives, and practicing
speaking on these issues can make a positive difference during the
hearing.
IV. THE LEGAL ADVOCATE AND MEDICAL TREATMENT
An advocate in a poverty law clinic should assist the mentally ill
client whenever appropriate, given the vulnerability of the client. To
define the incompetent client as one who is in need of protection forces
us to examine what the legal advocate must protect. What are the
objectives of representation? Clearly, the role of the legal advocate is to
ensure that the client receives representation in the issue for which the
advocate has been retained. Should the legal advocate also seek medical
treatment for the client?
Under the Mental Health Act, a person may be involuntarily
examined by a psychiatrist only where a physician, justice of the peace,
or a peace officer has a reasonable cause to believe that the person has:
40 S.Delaney, "What if your Client has a Disability? A Practical Guide on how to
Communicate with and Accommodate People with Disabilities" in Law Society of Upper Canada,
36th BarAdmission Course: Phase Three (Toronto: LS.U.C., 1994) at Day 2-26.
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threatened or attempted or is threatening or attempting to cause bodily harm to himself
or herself; has behaved or is behaving violently towards another person or has caused or
is causing another person to fear bodily harm; or has shown or is showing a lack of
competence to care for himself or herself and ... is apparently suffering from mental
disorder of a nature or quality that will likely result in serious bodily harm to the person;
serious bodily harm to another person; or imminent and serious physical impairment of
the person.41

This high threshold of involuntary commitment to a psychiatric facility
means that one cannot be forced to receive treatment unless the mental
disorder is such that it creates a situation of potential danger. As the
Mental HealthAct is strongly influenced by a policy of community rather
than institutional care, even when the criteria of risk are met, the
legislation allows for a person to be detained for a maximum of seventytwo hours unless a certificate of involuntary admission is completed.
Once a person is officially admitted, the initial period of detention for
two weeks can be extended one additional month under a first certificate
of renewal, two months under a second certificate of renewal, and three
additional months under a third or subsequent renewal. 42 All patients
have access to an appeal process. Even though the person is
involuntarily detained, he or she may refuse treatment if found mentally
competent to make decisions about medical care. 43 Melody Martin
explains:
These situations ..., the high threshold for commitment, and the even higher threshold
for treatment ... are the result of a determination about the appropriate balance of
values; but while these high standards provide important procedural protection for the
mentally ill person, they can be a source of great frustration for concerned parties who
are unable to secure adequate care for the mentally ill person... .44

Unless the client's mental disorder is of a sufficient severity to be
dangerous, or render the person incompetent to make informed
decisions, the advocate cannot ensure that the client receives medical
treatment, even if the advocate perceives this type of assistance to be
appropriate.
V. MODELS OF ADVOCACY
Where the legal advocate continues to represent an incompetent
41

Mental HealthAct, supra note 13, s. 15(1)(a-f).

42

Ibid s. 20(4).

43

Supra note 15, s. 10.

44 Martin, supranote 12 at 76.
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client, the legal advocate must decide the type of service he or she will
offer. Warren Lehman distinguishes primarily between the extremes:
advocates as "hired guns," who assume complete responsibility for the
client's interests, and advocates as "technicians," who are consulted not
for their advice, but only for their knowledge of the rules. 4 5 Both
extremes give rise to important ethical concerns.
Martin refers to the model of taking all clients' instructions,
regardless of rationality or outcome, as the "cab driver" model: "the
'cab-driver' model implies that the client, as the employer of the lawyer
is entitled to direct the lawyer (as he would a cab driver) at any point, as
long as the lawyer remains within the outer ethical boundaries that
constitute the 'rules of the road.'" 46 The refusal to make a distinction
between a competent and an incompetent client is often premised on the
notion that the advancement of autonomy is the advocate's highest
priority: a finding of incompetency is equivalent to the undesirable
deprivation of rights. Proponents of this model argue that for the legal
advocate to suggest that someone is incapable of making decisions may
be tantamount to disloyalty and inevitably forces the advocate into the
role of adversary. 47 This argument, however, "confuses questions of
capacity with questions of consent." 48 Autonomy is derived from the
individual's ability to make informed choices. If the client is incapable of
understanding the outcome of his or her decisions, then the client is not
exercising autonomy, and the advocate is not protecting it.
Following the "cab-driver" model, in Jane's case we may have
been instructed to argue that the medical report forms filled out by her
doctor were incorrect, as they do not contain a reference to cancer. In
Alice's case, we may have been instructed to argue that she was unable
to work because of injuries she sustained in a motor vehicle accident,
although medical evidence denied that there is anything organically
wrong with her. This model, however, presents two ethical dilemmas for
the advocate: under tsuc Rule 10, Commentary 2(g), the advocate must
not "knowingly assert something for which there is no reasonable basis
in evidence," 49 and secondly, the legal advocate is also instructed to
"raise fearlessly every issue, advance every argument, and ask every
question, however distasteful which the lawyer thinks will help the
45

W. Lehman, "The Pursuit of a Client's Interest" (1979) 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1078 at 1078.

46 Martin, supranote 12 at 103.
47

Tremblay, supra note 8 at 538.
48 Martin, supranote 12 at 103.
49 Rules, supranote 2 at 34.
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client's case and to endeavour to obtain for the client the benefit of
every remedy and defence authorized by law."50 If the advocate were to
argue the issue of a doctor conspiracy or the existence of a physical
injury refuted by medical evidence, the client would likely lose credibility
before the board. The board may suspect that the client is trying to
deceive them. Both Jane's and Alice's cases illuminate the importance
of being able to determine mental capacity: "[a]dherence to
conventional informed consent practise in [some] cases is not only
painful to the lawyer but may be morally irresponsible. The dilemma is
plain: it may be morally wrong to intervene, and morally wrong not to
intervene."51 Like withdrawing, the "cab-driver" model only permits the
advocate to find an easy answer to a difficult moral issue.
A. The Appointment of a Guardian
Where the advocate feels that the client cannot make informed
decisions, a reasonable solution may be the appointment of a guardian:
"[w]herever it is possible, by the provision of appropriate supports, to
enhance the decisionmaking ability of an individual, that is the course
most in line with the values of our society. If that ability cannot be
enhanced to the point of competency, and as a result the individual is at
risk, plenary or partial guardianship may be necessary." 52 Commentary
1 of Rule 2 of the Lsuc Rules declares that competence "goes beyond
formal qualifications of the lawyer to practice law. It has to do with the
sufficiency of the lawyer's qualifications to deal with the matter in
question, and includes knowledge and skill and the ability to use them
effectively in the interests of the client."5 3 Section 52 of the Substitute
Decisions Act, 199254 allows, on application, the appointment of a
guardian for a person who is incapable of personal care and, as a result,
needs decisions to be made on his or her behalf. Under the legislation,
the powers of the guardian extend to settling and commencing
proceedings on a person's behalfL5 Tremblay, however, wisely cautions:

50 Ibid at 33.
51 Tremblay, supra note 8 at 540.
52 H. Savage & C. McKague, Mental Health Law in Canada(Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) at
197.
53

Rules, supra note 2 at 3.

54

S.O.1992, c. 30.

55 Ibid.s. 59(2)(b), (c).
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Short of imprisonment or commitment, appointment of a guardian is the most serious

restriction of a person's liberty. The paternalistic and benign purposes of guardianship
do not blunt its harsh consequences. A lawyer's decision to impose guardianship on a
client without his consent or understanding is particularly difficult to justify given the
lawyer's obligations of loyalty and zeal. 56

Where the advocate is directly responsible for this deprivation of rights,
he or she should consider the impact of the guardian's decisions, as it is
the client who must ultimately live with the consequences of the
instructions made on his or her behalf.
The Health Care ConsentAct, 1996 requires that the decision to
give or refuse treatment on an incapable person's behalf, must be made
in accordance with two primary principles: if the person knows of a wish
applicable to the circumstances expressed while capable and after
attaining the age of 16, this wish must be recognized; if, however, the
person is unaware of the incapable person's preferences, the person shall
act in the incapable person's best interests. 5 7 Welch stresses:
When a substitute decision-maker must be used, as in the case of incompetent patients,
every effort must be made to apply the patient's values and concerns. A broader, holistic
view of an individual's interests ..., physical, psychological, social, financial, and spiritual
... subsumes a scientific, medically indicated view of best interests into a substituted
judgement perspective. Only an effort to stand in that patient's shoes will begin to reveal
the totality of the patient's interests.58

Similarly, the Substitute DecisionsAct, 1992 also instructs that the person
determining another's best interests shall take into consideration the
values and beliefs that the decisionmaker knows the incapable person
held when capable, and believes he or she would continue to hold if
capable.5 9 This position corresponds to a poverty law clinic's
commitment to respect the autonomy of the clients:
Even if incompetent, a person still has beliefs, values, and preferences. The patient is a
person with rituals of meaning, symbols of interpretation, and some developed sense of
self. Even for persons incompetent to exercise autonomous judgement, these personal
attributes remain important. The whole purpose behind obtaining consent from
someone else on behalf of an incompetent person, the very reason we do not simply give
the researcher or the physician unfettered discretion to do what is best, is to attempt to
make the elements that comprise a unique personality .... the patient's desires, needs,
priorities, and beliefs ...6 0as close to controlling in the decision as they would be if that
person were competent.

56 Tremblay, supra note 8 at 559-60.
57 Health Care ConsentAct, supra note 15, s. 21(1) 1. & 2.
58 Welch, supra note 9 at 1637-38.
59 Substitute DecisionsAct, supra note 54, s. 66(4)(a).
60
Welch, supra note 9 at 1639.
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A guardian must also take into account whether the decision is likely to
improve the quality of the person's life, prevent the quality of the
person's life from deteriorating, or reduce the rate at which the quality
of the person's life is likely to deteriorate. 61 The final factor to consider
includes whether the benefits of any decision will outweigh the risk of
harm of an alternative decision. 62 Where the guardian fails to perform
this duty satisfactorily, the court may terminate the guardianship.
While the existence of a guardian protects the advocate from
making decisions on behalf of the client, the advocate may be placed in
the highly uncomfortable position of becoming the client's opposition.
When the advocate brings an application for the assessment of an
individual, this individual may resist and oppose the petition. Advocates
must rely on their interactions, which will violate lawyer-client
confidentiality, to provide evidence. Tremblay explains:
Thus, viewed from its harshest perspective, the process looks like this: the client hires the
lawyer to serve as his loyal agent and confidante; the lawyer promises him that those
expectations are warranted and will be fulfilled; the lawyer then uses her client's
confidences to bring a court proceeding that will deprive him of all his rights, and will
require him to obtain another lawyer to defend against it; and all the while the lawyer
plans to resume representing him once this distraction is over.63

Despite the obvious awkwardness of this process, the risk of alienating
the client may outweigh the consequences of ineffective representation.
The legal advocate should explain to the client his or her concerns of
otherwise violating key principles of professional ethics. If the client can
be made to understand that the process of assessment is ventured only to
ensure that his or her best interests are recognized, the relationship
between the advocate and client may not be irreparably damaged.
If the advocate is convinced that a guardian should be appointed,
an alternative to the advocate making the application would be to
encourage a third party to request the initial assessment. Although the
referral approach allows the advocate to avoid the complication of
directly opposing the client, the advocate will likely be placed in the
ironic position of having to defend the client's capacity to make
decisions. Lsuc Rule 3 asserts that "[t]he lawyer must be both honest
and candid when advising clients." 64 There remains, therefore, the
important issue of the client's confidentiality and trust being breached:
61 Health Care ConsentAct,supra note 15, s.42(2)(c)(1)(i)-(iii).
62 Ibid. s. 42(2)(c)(2).
63

Tremblay, supra note 8 at 560-61.

64

Rules, supra note 2 at 7.
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It is incorrect to assume that the duties of loyalty, zeal and confidentiality only restrain

the lawyer from harming her client directly. Even if the lawyer's actions are not a priori
harmful, they may be unacceptable. The lawyer's ethical duties promote client choice
of 'harm' is one of individual client perception, not one of objective
and the question
5
measure.

The advocate's option to initiate the appointment of a guardian either
personally or through a third party forces the advocate to violate
important ethical obligations in order to observe other key principles.
B. The Advocate as Guardian
A fourth option available to the legal advocate in representing an
incompetent client is for the advocate to be appointed as the client's
official guardian. This option, however, is completely inappropriate in
the context of a community legal aid clinic, as it places the advocate in a
clear position of authority over the client. Assuming this position of
superiority clearly contradicts any clinic's dedication to respecting the
autonomy of the client. The role of guardian can have different
responsibilities from the role of advocate. While the advocate has an
obligation to consult with the client regarding what the advocate should
do on his or her behalf, the guardian's role is to determine the best
interests of the client and act accordingly. This shift in responsibility
from taking instructions to giving them can result in the advocate
disregarding many important ethical rules which should ordinarily
govern the advocate-client dynamic:
In assuming the guardian role, attorneys frequently shun many of the required
obligations by not conducting pre-hearing investigation, by first speaking with the client
just hours before the hearing, and by substituting their judgement for that of the client.
Scholars have advanced several reasons for this disregard of traditional representation
obligations, including insufficient medical knowledge, a desire to see that the sick get
treatment, and the absence of a clearly defined role for the attorney.66

The client is generally placed at a clear disadvantage when a legal
advocate determines what is in his or her best interest. The statutory
guidelines instruct that another's best interests should ideally be based
on the values of the person exhibited when they were capable. In most
cases, the legal advocate will not have known the client when he or she
was capable. Therefore, the client's best interests will be established
65

Tremblay, supranote 8 at 562.

66 N. Wolf, "The Ethical Dilemmas Faced by Attorneys Representing the Mentally IIin Civil
Commitment Proceedings" (1992) 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 163 at 172-73.
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solely on the advocate's perception of how a reasonable person would or
should respond. As stated earlier, the advocate is unlikely to know the
client outside the narrow context of the clinic. As the role of guardian is
to exercise discretion on another's behalf, the advocate is no longer
clearly accountable to anyone for poor quality service. Lsuc Rule 2(b)
asserts that "[t]he lawyer should serve the client in a conscientious,
diligent and efficient manner, and should provide a quality of service at
least equal to that which lawyers generally would expect of a competent
lawyer in a like situation and should avoid unsatisfactory professional
practice." 67 Commentary 8 lists numerous examples of what may
constitute unsatisfactory professional practice such as a "[f]ailure to
keep the client reasonably informed" 6 8 and "[f]ailure to keep
appointments with clients without explanation or apology." 69 Where the
advocate fails to offer a high quality of service, to the detriment of the
client, who will complain? It is unlikely that clients will have the means
to complain. Furthermore, given their state of incompetence, they will
lack credibility. It is extremely important, therefore, that the advocate's
actions be monitored so that the advocate's professional responsibilities
are held to a strict standard.
C. OtherApproaches to Advocacy
The remaining options for the legal advocate with a client whose
competence is highly questionable consist of different approaches to
advocacy. Lsuc Rule 10 addresses directly the concept of the lawyer as
advocate and explains that the lawyer must represent the client
"resolutely and honourably within the limits of the law." 70 The concept
of acting "resolutely and honourably" is extremely vague and offers little
guidance to advocates who are representing clients who may be unable
to make sound decisions.
One interpretation of acting "honourably" may mean that the
role of advocate is to take an automatically contradictory stance to that
of the opposition. This model presumes that once the client seeks the
help of the advocate with any particular issue, the client will want to'
oppose any position raised by the other side. In the context of criminal
67

Rules, supra note 2 at 3.

68Ibid. at 4.
69Ibid.
701Ibid. at 33.
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law, for example, "the 'default position' of the criminal defence lawyer
(in the absence of instructions of the client) should always be to oppose
the position that the Crown is advancing." 71 In the context of social
assistance law, the advocate would act on the client's instructions to, for
example, appeal the decision of the Director of Income Maintenance to
render a person ineligible for benefits as a permanently unemployable
person. Once the client directs the advocate to appeal the decision, the
advocate would feel obligated to vigorously argue that the client cannot
seek remunerative employment. The challenge with this model is how
vigorously must the advocate argue? If the advocate assumes that the
only instruction the incompetent client can reasonably make is for the
advocate to pursue a specific result, the advocate may feel that any
argument, including that the client possesses a mental disorder, may be
fair game. Although this model technically complies with Commentary 2
of Rule 10, the argument that Jane's sincere belief of having cancer is
proof of mental incapacity which prevents her from working would be
likely to result in a humiliating experience for the client, with devastating
emotional consequences.
A second interpretation of the professional standard of
representing a client honourably may exist in the model that the client
should be persuaded to choose the most beneficial option. A primary
responsibility of the advocate is to ensure that clients are informed of
their options so that they can make educated decisions based on that
information. The advocate is to respect an informed decision.
Encouraging a client to change his or her decision may be tantamount to
coercion, given that the lawyer is generally considered to be an expert
and is, therefore, in a position of authority over the client. In the context
of poverty law, manipulation contradicts the commitment of a
community clinic to encourage clients to take back control over their
lives. Unfortunately, it is in the environment of poverty law where this
model may be most easily implemented. Clients often have only
minimal education and can be intimidated by their situation. How the
advocate presents the options will directly impact upon the client's
decision. Most clients are simply too relieved at finally having access to
assistance to question the quality or means of representation. Many
clients will even encourage the advocate to make their decisions for
them.
A third possible interpretation of the standard of representing a
client honourably, is for the lawyer to assume the role of unofficial
guardian to determine the client's best interests in the context of the
71 Martin, supra note 12 at 103.
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issue for which he or she has been retained:
The lawyer would consider herself as responsible for the mentally ill client. The
responsibility would be centred upon the client's legal situation and the client's mental
and physical state would be within the purview of the lawyer's responsibility to the extent
that these states influence or interact with the client's legal situation. The lawyer's
responsibility would be based upon the fact that the mentally ill client, by virtue of his
mental disorder, and regardless of his fitness, is in a more vulnerable position relative to
the legal process than is the average 'ordinary' client. 72

This model is rooted in the concept of paternalism which has
been defined as "interference with a person's liberty of action justified
by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good happiness, needs
interests or values of the person being coerced." 73 The advocate might
override the client's instructions based on what the advocate believes to
be the more favourable option available to the client. This option has
been historically favoured by lawyers even where the client has been
competent to act as it permits advocates to protect their professional
reputation: "Attorneys are trained and expected to exercise such
judgement: to follow every whim of their clients would make them little
more than 'mouthpieces.' 74 The other main argument frequently
advanced in favour of the advocate being a decisionmaker is efficiency:
"[m]ost typically, proponents of this argument raise the spectre of a
never-ending trial punctuated by frequent interruptions and objections
by the client and lengthened by constant recesses for attorney-client
conferences." 7S
The concept of paternalism in the setting of a legal aid clinic is
inappropriate for the same reasons this model would be easy to execute.
The client and advocate will often represent different levels of
education, income, and standards of living. Also, there may exist
differences in language, race, and culture. Given that the advocate and
client will have a diverse range of experiences, the advocate is not in a
good position to determine what option is in the best interests of the
client. Clients of a legal aid clinic may demand a significant amount of
reassurance and patience. Consultation may also require the exertion of
extra effort, as many do not have telephones, and those who do rarely
have answering machines. Nevertheless, the advocate must keep in
mind that the service the advocate offers to the client extends beyond
72
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achieving the desired outcome and includes the treatment of the client.
The very fact of the client's vulnerability should suggest to the advocate
that the rules of professional ethics must be meticulously observed.
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1993, the United Kingdom Law Commission released a study
entitled Mentally IncapacitatedAdults and Decision-Making: Medical
Treatment and Research.76 The paper was guided by the following
principles for reform: people should be enabled and encouraged to
make decisions which they are able to make; the intervention of
substitute decisionmakers should be as limited as possible and
concerned to achieve what the person himself would have wanted; and
proper safeguards should be provided against all forms of abuse. 7 7
Although the study relates specifically to raising consciousness in the
medical profession, the legal profession can also benefit from
considering these same principles.
While the LSUC Rules of ProfessionalConduct attempt to offer
guidance to the legal advocate with respect to quality of service, these
guidelines fail to consider the specific needs of the questionably
competent client. In most cases, the competence of a client is irrelevant;
all clients deserve to benefit from the same strict standard of
professionalism. Clients, however, could be better served if their
advocates could represent their interests with a degree of certainty of
how these interests may be determined. The Lsuc Rules should assist the
legal advocate in determining if the client is able to understand their
legal situation and what to do where incompetency is suspected. The
Rules should narrow the options currently available and attempt to
define in what capacity the advocate can most serve the client
honourably.
If the client is able to make informed decisions regarding his or
her legal representation, the doctrine of informed consent must govern
the advocate-client dynamic. The demand of voluntary and educated
consent encourages communication that may protect both parties from
future misunderstandings, clarifies each party's role and their mutual
expectations, and makes the autonomy of the individual a clear priority.
Finally, informed consent strengthens the integrity of a profession that
76 U.K., The Law Commission, Mentally IncapacitatedAdults and Decision-Making Medical
Treatment and Research (Consultation Paper No. 129) (London: H.M.S.O., 1993).
77
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has been plagued with the distrust of the public.78
Ultimately, we did not challenge or suppress Jane's theory of the
existence of a medical conspiracy. We argued that she was unable to
engage in employment based on the symptoms that her family doctor
listed on the medical report form she submitted to the medical advisory
board. We included previous medical reports and a recent report in our
possession, with the permission of the client, that included a diagnosis of
a variety of conditions, including depression and hypochondria. While
Jane resented some of the diagnoses of her physicians, she agreed with
our suggestion that the reports would be helpful, as they demonstrated a
prolonged history of medical illness. We promised that she would have
the opportunity to relay to the board how she felt about the quality of
medical treatment she had received. The board ultimately granted her
appeal noting, "[e]ven if the conditions identified by the MAB in
themselves do not render the Appellant permanently unemployable, the
Appellant's testimony showed that her physical conditions ... have had a

profoundly negative mental impact on her and made the Appellant
paranoid. She was remarkably unfocused, convinced her physical
conditions were fatal."79
In Alice's case, again we carefully explained her options: we
could argue the existence of physical injuries although we had no
collaborating medical evidence, or we could focus on her doctor's
diagnosis of chronic pain syndrome. Our research into chronic pain
syndrome established that the condition has a strong psychological
component. We explained the definition and theories of chronic pain
syndrome to the client and reassured her that the existence of a
psychological component does not diminish the reality of her pain. The
client appreciated the fact that we took the time to explain to her the
significance of her medical condition and felt reassured that she fit into
the profile of a chronic pain client, after doctors had seemed to
undermine her complaints of pain. At the hearing, Alice enthusiastically
participated in my closing statement, vigorously agreeing to my
statements of the impact of chronic pain syndrome. She was clearly
empowered by the experience.8 0
While a tension exists between the advocate's desire to take the
vulnerable client's instructions and the desire to protect the client from
an undesirable outcome, ultimately, the most important rule of
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79 Medical Advisory Board, File No. P0313-23 (Feb. 1996), Chair Ghosh [unreported].
In the end, Alice was found to be eligible for PuE benefits.
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professional conduct is established under Rule 1:
Integrity is the fundamental quality of any person who seeks to practise as a member of

the legal profession. If the client is in any doubt as to the lawyer's trustworthiness, the
essential element in the true lawyer-client relationship will be missing. If personal

integrity is lacking the lawyer's usefulness to the client and reputation within the
profession will be destroyed regardless of how competent the lawyer may be. 81

Ultimately, by carefully explaining what options are available and taking
our client's instructions, we justified our clients' trust in our ability to
advocate on their behalf. While a favourable decision by the SARB is
obviously desirable, a significant victory also exists in simply treating the
client with respect and dignity.

81

Rules, supranote 2 at 1.

